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Abstract 
Advanced information technologies (ITs) are increasingly assuming tasks that have previously 
required human capabilities, such as learning and judgment. What drives this technology 
anthropomorphism (TA), or the attribution of humanlike characteristics to IT? What is it about users, 
IT, and their interactions that influences the extent to which people think of technology as 
humanlike? While TA can have positive effects, such as increasing user trust in technology, what are 
the negative consequences of TA? To provide a framework for addressing these questions, we 
advance a theory of TA that integrates the general three-factor anthropomorphism theory in social 
and cognitive psychology with the needs-affordances-features perspective from the information 
systems (IS) literature. The theory we construct helps to explain and predict which technological 
features and affordances are likely: (1) to satisfy users’ psychological needs, and (2) to lead to TA. 
More importantly, we problematize some negative consequences of TA. Technology features and 
affordances contributing to TA can intensify users’ anchoring with their elicited agent knowledge 
and psychological needs and also can weaken the adjustment process in TA under cognitive load. 
The intensified anchoring and weakened adjustment processes increase egocentric biases that lead 
to negative consequences. Finally, we propose a research agenda for TA and egocentric biases. 
Keywords: Psychological Needs, Technology Anthropomorphism, Affordance, Technology 
Features, Egocentric Biases 
Jason Bennett Thatcher was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on February 14, 2019 and 
underwent two revisions.  
1 Introduction 
Anthropomorphism refers to a general human 
tendency “to imbue the real or imagined behavior of 
nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics, 
motivations, intentions, or emotions” (Epley et al., 
2007, p. 864). This tendency involves social cognitive 
processes that occur when people interact with 
inanimate objects (Epley, 2018). Since humans are 
bombarded and interact with novel, lifelike 
technologies in an increasingly unstable and insecure 
world, anthropomorphism is becoming ever more 
commonplace—and more consequential. Users 
attribute humanlike behaviors and characteristics to 
these technologies (Waytz, Epley et al. 2010; Waytz, 
Cacioppo et al. (2010). They might perceive their voice 
assistant as their “friend” or “partner,” attributing a 
humanlike mind to the voice assistant and talking as 
they would talk with human partners (Moussawi, 
2016). 
Anthropomorphism can have positive influences on  
effectance, social connections, empathy, and 
responsibility—particularly when they face high levels 
of uncertainty, insecurity, and social isolation (Epley 
et al., 2007; Pfeuffer et al., 2019; Severson & 
Woodard, 2018). As people interact with novel and 
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complex technologies, anthropomorphizing helps 
them make sense of and understand the technology’s 
actions, and therefore to increase both trust in (Qiu & 
Benbasat, 2009) and adoption of (Benbasat & Wang, 
2005) these technologies. For example, studies have 
found that people are more likely to collaborate with 
robots that they find playful (Kiesler & Goetz, 2002). 
In addition, virtual assistants make software easier for 
users to learn (Moreale & Watt, 2004).  
Epley et al. (2007) developed a sociopsychological 
theory of anthropomorphism that is based on the 
perception of the mind (Heider & Simmel, 1944). 
Mind perception research (Waytz, Gray et al., 2010) 
argues that people attribute mental states such as belief 
and intention to other people. The psychological 
mechanisms involved in anthropomorphism are 
“exceptionally ordinary,” in the sense that they involve 
the same mind perception, whether the target is a 
human or a nonhuman agent (Epley, 2018, p. 591).  
Anthropomorphism is triggered by two fundamental 
motivations and one cognitive factor (Epley et al., 
2007). The motivational factors1—sociality needs and 
effectance needs—lead to human engagement with the 
“mind” of a nonhuman agent and hence to humans’ 
perception of humanlike traits in an agent. Sociality 
needs drive people to form a social bond, and this 
motivation can lead people to believe that the 
nonhuman agent has humanlike features, such as an 
extroverted personality type that fosters a sense of 
bonding. Effectance needs drive people to explain, 
predict, and control the behavior of a nonhuman agent. 
Epley et al. (2007) suggest that when a gadget behaves 
unpredictably, people are more likely to associate a 
humanlike mind with it.  
Anthropomorphism also stems from the cognitive 
factor of elicited agent knowledge (Epley et al. 2007). 
This cognitive factor involves looking for humanlike 
features and movements in a nonhuman agent and then 
inductively creating associated connections in the 
brain that links the nonhuman agent to humans. When 
these features and movements are ambiguous or 
hidden, people project and imagine their own 
perspectives and other self-knowledge into their 
interpretations of the nonhuman agent and hence 
produce egocentric biases in their judgments of it.  
Subsequent research has validated Epley et al.’s (2007) 
three-factor theory of anthropomorphism and has 
demonstrated the existence and prevalence of 
anthropomorphism: Humans construe many 
nonhuman agents as human. However, the theory was 
not developed to explain information technology (IT). 
 
1 To connect Epley et al.’s (2007) theory and Karahanna et al.’s 
(2018) perspective, we us the term “needs” rather than motivation 
referring to sociality and effectance. 
The theory treats technology like any other inanimate 
object.  
Thus far, the information systems (IS) literature has 
not systematically discussed what gives rise to 
technology anthropomorphism (TA)—that is, how and 
why humans perceive advanced IT as humanlike and 
how anthropomorphizing varies by technology. In 
addition, the IS literature, with few exceptions (e.g., 
Demetis & Lee, 2018; Schuetz & Venkatesh, 2020), 
has focused primarily on the positive consequences of 
perceiving IT as humanlike. Studies have identified 
increased trust among users (Qiu & Benbasat, 2009), 
adoption behavior (Benbasat & Wang, 2005), and 
higher purchase intentions (Wang et al., 2007) when IT 
induces anthropomorphism.  
Despite the general neglect of negative implications, 
some negative aspects have been empirically reported. 
For example, humanlike features attached to 
nonhuman agents can create agency tensions that can 
reduce users’ connectedness to the agent (Kang & 
Kim, 2020). In addition to the perception of threat, 
negative implications can involve stereotypes 
projected onto the technology. A recent popular press 
article about a technology exhibition in Germany 
described how a “a sex doll called ‘Samantha’—on 
display at Linz’s Arts Electronica Festival—was so 
severely ‘molested’ by a group of men, it was sent 
home in desperate need of repair and ‘badly soiled’” 
(Norris, 2017). The article suggests that the robot may 
reinforce causes of sexual violence against women, 
namely male entitlement and power.  
In this paper, we enrich the prevailing explanations of 
anthropomorphism to develop a more detailed theory 
that explains research questions and perspectives 
related to TA: (1) Why is anthropomorphism more 
likely to take place with some technologies than others, 
and (2) how do egocentric biases of TA occur? Our 
development of a theory of TA integrates the three-
factor theory of anthropomorphism with the needs-
affordances-features perspective offered by Karahanna 
et al. (2018). We then explain how certain features of 
technology enable the affordances of TA and how 
affordances can intensify egocentric biases. Egocentric 
biases also occur because people consider the 
perceptions of others, including their thoughts and 
feelings, to be the same as their own (Epley et al., 
2004).  
Through the TA theory we advance here, we make 
several contributions to the IS literature. The theory of 
TA can help in predicting how different technological 
features might affect users’ anthropomorphizing. Our 
theory considers both the users’ psychological factors 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1431 
and the technological artifacts to address the 
differentiating effects of technology. In addition, our 
theorizing on the operation of egocentric biases helps 
explain some of the negative consequences of 
anthropomorphism related to advanced technologies. 
Egocentric biases can be an important antecedent to the 
misuse of technological artifacts. Exploring how 
egocentric biases are produced during users’ 
interactions with advanced technology is important 
because complex, humanlike mental capacities, 
including morality, are increasingly being attributed to 
technology (Epley, 2018; Kahn et al., 2013). 
2 Background on 
Anthropomorphism 
In this section, we provide a definition of 
anthropomorphism and review both the IS and human-
computer interaction (HCI) literatures. In the next 
section, we introduce Epley et al.’s (2008) seminal 
three-factor anthropomorphism theory.  
2.1 From Prehistoric to Modern Times 
The term “anthropomorphism” dates to at least the 
sixth century BCE, when Xenophanes used it to 
describe “how gods and other supernatural agents 
tended to bear a striking physical resemblance to their 
believers” (Waytz, Cacioppo et al., 2010, p. 220). Over 
the centuries, scientists and philosophers have 
“advocated anthropomorphism as a necessary tool for 
understanding nonhuman agents” (Epley et al., 2018, 
p. 871). Anthropomorphism has generally been viewed 
as a universal, invariant, and automatic process.  
Early psychological research on anthropomorphism 
focused on the psycholinguistic representation of 
nonhuman agents and on the tendency to attribute 
humanlike features to animals (e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth, 
1990). Anthropomorphic descriptions of animals 
continue to be popular in entertainment. To illustrate, in 
the recent movie The Art of Racing in the Rain, the 
golden retriever Enzo (named after Enzo Ferrari) was 
depicted as experiencing car racing like a human: as 
exhilarating and as a way to learn critical life skills. 
Modern research on anthropomorphism generally 
focuses on psychological mechanisms that lead people 
to attribute humanlike qualities, such as competencies 
and mental states, to nonhumans, or on people’s 
propensity to turn nonhuman agents into humans 
(Epley et al., 2007). Research on psychology 
mechanisms strives to explain variability in 
anthropomorphism and how it is moderated by 
situational factors (Shin & Kim, 2018; Chen et al., 
2017; Bartz et al., 2016), dispositional factors (Epley 
et al., 2008; Eyssel & Reich, 2013; Kim & McGill, 
2018), and cultural factors (Epley et al., 2007; Ötting 
and Mayer, 2018).  
Anthropomorphism applies not just to behaviors but 
also to mental and affective states, intentions, 
conscious awareness, and emotions associated with 
nonhuman entities (Waytz, Cacioppo et al., 2010). 
This research is important because, as Epley et al. 
(2007, p. 864) write, “treating agents as human versus 
nonhuman has a powerful impact on whether those 
agents are treated as moral agents worthy of respect 
and concern or treated merely as entities, on how 
people expect those agents to behave in the future, and 
on people’s interpretations of these agents’ behavior in 
the present.”  
2.2 Anthropomorphism in IS and HCI 
A limited discourse in IS addresses the attribution of 
humanlike dispositions, traits, and processes to 
nonhuman agents. Suh et al. (2011, p. 712) defines 
avatars as “another self in the virtual world with the 
characteristics of a person.” Lankton et al. (2015, p. 
881) argues that technologies take on “humanness,” 
“having the form or characteristics of humans.” Such 
humanness then implies that trust—traditionally a 
human mental state directed toward another human 
entity—can be placed in or directed toward IT. Riedl 
et al. (2014) provides neuroscientific evidence 
revealing the similarities and differences between the 
perception and trust of humans versus the perception 
and trust of humanlike avatars. Although “people are 
better able to predict the trustworthiness of humans 
than the trustworthiness of avatars,” they note, “the 
trustworthiness learning rate is similar, whether 
interacting with humans or avatars” (Riedl et al., 2014, 
p. 84). In a different research trajectory, Yuan and 
Dennis (2017) found that consumers were willing to 
pay more when the product or its presentation induced 
anthropomorphism. 
Recent attention has turned to nascent 
anthropomorphic design theories of IS—for example, 
those related to conversational agents and robo-
advisers (e.g., Jung et al., 2017; Pfeuffer et al., 2019; 
Diederich et al., 2020). Pfeuffer et al. (2019) derived 
categories of features that give rise to “humanness” 
and studied when individuals do and do not attribute 
human characteristics to a technology. According to 
Pfeuffer et al. (2019), anthropomorphic design 
involves various sensory features (e.g., auditory, 
visual, and mental or personality features) that would 
induce a user to infer humanlike characteristics, 
intentions, behaviors, or emotions. Diederich et al. 
(2020) have advanced a design theory of 
anthropomorphic enterprise conversational agents.  
Meanwhile, other studies in the IS literature discuss 
more generally how systems are growing in their 
cognitive capabilities and how human-machine 
interactions resemble human-to-human interactions. 
Such cognitive systems are self-adaptive and self-
referential and are neither stable nor transparent in 
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their functions (Schuetz and Venkatesh, 2020). 
Demetis and Lee (2018) provide vivid examples of 
how humans might become the “artifacts” that are 
manipulated by highly humanlike technology.  
In the HCI literature, the discourse is empirically rich 
in terms of how nonhuman agents that have 
anthropomorphized features influence interaction. For 
example, Nass et al. (1994) initiated the use of the 
phrase, “computers as social actors” (CASA). They 
suggest that users interact with computers that have 
humanlike features (e.g., voice outputs) in a manner 
similar to the way in which they interact with humans 
(e.g., exhibiting politeness and assigning stereotypes). 
Anthropomorphic interfaces (e.g., humanlike language 
used by personal computers when humans interact 
with them) have been shown to increase engagement 
and promote more effective collaboration (Nass et al., 
1994) and decision-making (Burgoon et al., 2000). In 
addition, research has found that different 
anthropomorphic features can compensate for each 
other. For example, limited conversational capabilities 
can be compensated for with visual interface cues in 
interactive conversational agents (Go & Sundar, 2019). 
But humanlike features attached to nonhuman agents 
can also create agency tensions that may reduce users’ 
connectedness to the technological agent. Kang and 
Kim (2020) found that anthropomorphic features can 
modify these tensions.  
In contrast to some of this research, in the HCI 
literature, Nass et al. (1994) rejected the assumption of 
anthropomorphism as a psychological process. Nass 
and Moon (2000) argued that human-to-human scripts 
are applied to computers mindlessly (and 
inappropriately). Nass et al. (1994) found that 
experienced adult computer users, when they were 
debriefed, did not admit that they would respond to a 
computer in the same way that they respond to humans. 
Nass and Moon (2000) argue that models of 
“thoughtful, sincere belief that the entity has human 
characteristics” (p. 93) cannot explain the processes 
that elicit stereotyping, politeness, and reciprocity 
toward a computer. Other studies challenge this notion 
because researchers have found evidence of “mindless 
anthropomorphism” (e.g., Kim & Sundar, 2012). Kim 
and Sundar (2012) also found in their lab studies that 
although users refused to claim that they perceive IT 
entirely as humanlike, they did mindlessly attribute 
human features to IT. Meanwhile, Araujo (2018, p. 
188) demonstrated support for both mindful and 
mindless anthropomorphism with conversational 
agents: “Users have less of an issue attributing 
anthropomorphic qualities mindfully to conversational 
agents than to websites and computers.”  
Research on anthropomorphism in HCI is expanding 
beyond the immediate visual or auditory humanlike 
features in the interaction. Studies have been more 
deeply considering mental states such as agency and 
intention and often include more general outcomes, 
including competition, ethical evaluation, and moral 
judgments about the nonhuman agent, as well as 
attitudes and connection to the company or 
organization (Araujo, 2018; de Graaf, 2016; de Kleijn 
et al, 2019; Ötting and Mayer, 2018).  
3 Three-Factor Model of 
Anthropomorphism from Epley et 
al. (2007) 
Research on anthropomorphism is most developed in 
social and cognitive psychology and in the neural 
sciences. On the basis of induction reasoning, Epley et 
al. (2007; p. 865) define anthropomorphism as a 
“process of inductive inference about nonhuman 
agents.” Epley et al. (2007) developed a generalized 
three-factor theory of anthropomorphism to provide a 
psychological account of anthropomorphism itself and 
to explain or predict systematic variability in people’s 
tendency to anthropomorphize nonhuman agents and 
“variability in the consequences that follow from 
anthropomorphism as well” (Epley et al., 2007; p. 
865). Note that the model is a generalized one that 
treats technology like any other nonhuman entity 
(Waytz, Cacioppo et al., 2010). At its core, the model 
has three factors: elicited agent knowledge, effectance 
needs, and sociality needs.  
3.1 Elicited Agent Knowledge 
Elicited agent knowledge is the first factor of 
anthropomorphism and is a cognitive factor (Epley et 
al., 2007). Anthropomorphizing is an inductive 
reasoning process, and inductive reasoning requires 
prior knowledge that can be transferred to the target. 
Anthropomorphism is predicted largely “by cognitive 
factors that determine the likelihood of activating, 
either chronically or situationally, knowledge about 
humans when making inferences about nonhuman 
agents; the likelihood of correcting this 
anthropomorphic knowledge; and the likelihood of 
applying knowledge about humans to nonhuman 
agents” (Epley et al., 2007; p. 868). This knowledge 
might be knowledge about humans in general or self-
knowledge, and people access it during inductive 
reasoning concerning nonhuman entities. Knowledge 
about humans is accessed because it is the most 
widely available and accessible category, with the 
most detailed and rich knowledge base—whether 
general or egocentric. For example, when trying to 
make sense of what it means to be a bat, people access 
generalized human sensory experiences or their own 
self-knowledge about sensory experiences and apply 
it to the actions of the bat (Epley et al., 2007). 
Inductive reasoning may be based on perceived 
similarities in appearance, movements, or action 
(Shin & Kim, 2018).  
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Elicited agent knowledge is corrected only if 
alternative knowledge structures are available and if 
the motivation to access these knowledge processes is 
present. Epley et al. (2007: p. 865) argue that “such 
correction processes are generally insufficient; such 
that final judgments are influenced in the direction of 
the most readily accessible information.” Hence, even 
when alternative knowledge structures are available, 
people do not necessarily use them; their readily 
accessible knowledge about humans in general and 
their self-knowledge about themselves still dominate. 
For example, Shin and Kim (2018) found that 
computer science majors were as likely as literature 
majors to anthropomorphize computers (i.e., a 
nonhuman entity), although computer science majors 
would be expected to have much richer cognitive 
representations of computers that could have provided 
a more accurate representation of the nonhuman entity.  
3.2 Effectance Needs 
Effectance needs represent the second factor in Epley et 
al.’s (2007) three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. In 
contrast to knowledge as a cognitive factor, effectance 
is a motivational factor that refers to humans’ basic need 
to “interact effectively in one’s environment” (Epley et 
al., 2007: p. 871). In this view, anthropomorphism might 
be used “to increase the predictability and 
comprehension of what would otherwise be an uncertain 
world” (Epley et al. 2007; p. 872). Thus, attributing 
humanlike traits to nonhuman entities enables people to 
render what is uncertain and insecure as more certain 
and controllable (Waytz, Morewedge et al., 2010). For 
example, people might adapt a detailed knowledge 
structure about themselves as a human being, so that the 
knowledge can be used to understand and predict the 
behavior of a novel, nonhuman entity and thus to regain 
control and to feel efficacious. Epley et al. (2007, p. 872) 
argue that “when effectance motivation is high, 
anthropomorphism should increase. When effectance 
motivation is low, anthropomorphism should decrease.” 
3.3 Sociality Needs 
Sociality is the third factor in the three-factor 
anthropomorphism theory (Epley et al., 2017). Like 
effectance, it is a motivational factor. Sociality needs 
refer to the basic human need to establish and maintain 
a sense of social connection with others; it increases 
the tendency to actively search for social connection in 
one’s environment (Epley et al., 2007). People feeling 
lonely or excluded or lacking social connection might 
try to escape from this often painful, isolated state by 
anthropomorphizing nonhuman agents and creating 
social connection with nonhuman agents, just as they 
might have done or wanted to do with human beings. 
For example, Epley et al. (2008, p. 342) revealed that 
when people are chronically isolated, they 
anthropomorphize pets by attributing more humanlike 
traits to them, “creating a sense of social support 
through a kind of inferential reproduction,” Epley et al. 
(2007, p. 872) argue that when sociality motivation is 
high, anthropomorphism is expected to increase, and 
when sociality motivation is low, anthropomorphism is 
expected to decrease.  
These three factors are no different from the ones that 
people use when making inductive inferences about 
other people. Hence, anthropomorphism has 
“exceptionally ordinary underpinnings” (Epley, 2018, 
p. 591). Anthropomorphism happens when humans 
treat nonhuman agents as if they were human agents.  
3.4 Egocentric Biases 
Just as people tend to rely on self-knowledge and  think 
of other people as having beliefs, attitudes, 
experiences, and preferences that are similar to their 
own, their tendency to anthropomorphize relies on the 
same presumptions of similarity. This reliance on self-
knowledge can lead to egocentric biases that are 
particularly rigid or inflexible when people carry out 
intensive anchoring on self-knowledge without 
making adjustments that take into account how the 
nonhuman agent is different from the self or from 
humans in general.  
Egocentric biases come from and are defined by the 
tendency to rely too heavily on one’s own perspective 
or to have a higher opinion of one’s understanding or 
perspective than is appropriate or accordant with 
reality (Epley & Caruso, 2004). Such biases can be 
driven by both cognitive knowledge and psychological 
needs (Epley et al. 2007). As Epley et al. (2007) point 
out, the accessibility of self-knowledge (elicited agent 
knowledge), the motivation to be effective social 
agents (effectance motivation), and the motivation for 
social connection (sociality motivation) can all give 
rise to egocentric biases. 
3.5 Moderators of the Three-Factor Theory 
of Anthropomorphism 
Epley et al. (2007) propose moderators that explain 
and predict the circumstances under which people have 
a stronger tendency to humanize nonhuman entities. 
These moderators fall into three categories: situational, 
dispositional, and cultural (see Table 1).  
Situational: The experience of being socially 
excluded or disconnected is a situational moderator 
that affects sociality needs (Shin & Kim, 2018) by 
heightening those needs. Hence, to satisfy these needs, 
people are more likely to anthropomorphize (Chen, 
Wan, & Levy, 2017). The sociality motivation can be 
lowered by, for example, situational reminders of 
social connection (Bartz et al., 2016).  
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Effectance needs Sociality needs 
Situational moderators Social exclusion   + 
Uncertainty or 
unpredictability in the 
environment 
 +  
Similarity between 
nonhuman and human 
entities 
+   
Cognitive load + + + 
Dispositional 
moderators 
Chronic sense of 
loneliness 
  + 
Need for control  +  
Cultural moderators Collectivism   + 
Individualism +   
Uncertainty avoidance  +  
In addition, uncertainty or unpredictability in the 
environment is another situational moderator, 
influencing the degree to which effectance needs lead to 
anthropomorphism. Waytz, Cacioppo et al. (2010) 
explored how the malfunction of computers, leading to 
uncertainty, caused users to anthropomorphize their 
computers more. Results revealed that the more 
frequently participants’ computers malfunctioned, the 
more likely they were to report that the computers 
appeared to have minds of their own or that their 
computers behaved as if they had their own beliefs and 
desires. Thus, the tendency to anthropomorphize is 
associated with the level of uncertainty in users’ 
environments.  
In previous studies, one of the most common 
situational moderators of elicited agent knowledge is a 
similarity between nonhuman and human entities in 
appearance, movement, and actions (Yuan & Dennis, 
2017). Increased cognitive load, triggered by the 
environment, is another situational moderator 
influencing people’s reliance on elicited agent 
knowledge and engendering anthropomorphism 
(Epley et al., 2007). Cognitive load theory (Sweller, 
1988) proposes that, under cognitive load, individuals 
have limited cognitive resources to allocate to the 
encoding, processing, and retrieval of information. 
Research suggests that people with higher cognitive 
loads engage in less in-depth thinking, causing them to 
adopt or rely on more accessible knowledge—
particularly self-knowledge. In addition, research has 
found that increased cognitive loads lead to heightened 
effectance (Kim et al., 2016) and sociality needs 
(Cacioppo & Hawkley 2009). 
Dispositional: People’s individual differences 
certainly moderate, or exert an influence on, how 
likely they are to anthropomorphize nonhuman agents. 
For example, a chronic sense of loneliness is one 
moderator of sociality needs that increases the 
likelihood of anthropomorphism (Epley et al., 2008). 
In HCI literature, Eyssel and Reich (2013) 
investigated how unfulfilled sociality needs make 
users more likely to engage with robots. They also 
found that people who report feeling lonelier, and thus 
have higher sociality needs, anthropomorphize robots 
more than participants who are less lonely. Individual 
differences in the need or capacity for personal control 
(Kim & McGill, 2018) can moderate how effectance 
needs drive anthropomorphism and falls into the 
dispositional category.  
Cultural: Hofstede (2001) proposes several major 
cultural dimensions that moderate the likelihood of 
anthropomorphizing, although they have not been 
empirically tested. For example, he identifies 
collectivism, which can be defined as “a value that is 
characterized by emphasis on cohesiveness among 
individuals and prioritization of the group over the 
self” (Schwarz, 1990). Individualism as the contrasting 
cultural dimension also plays a moderating role. Epley 
et al. (2007, p. 878) argue that “members of 
individualistic cultures tend to assess egocentric 
information and use their own self-knowledge more 
readily than members from collectivist cultures.” 
Accordingly, those from individualistic cultures may 
be more prone to egocentric biases.  
Epley et al. (2007) also theorized that cultural 
moderators might affect the three factors (i.e., sociality 
needs, effectance needs, and elicited agent knowledge) 
differently. For example, collectivism as a cultural 
moderator might increase the influence of sociality 
needs on anthropomorphism, whereas uncertainty 
avoidance—defined as “the extent to which the 
members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or 
unknown situations” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 161)—might 
heighten the influence of effectance needs in 
individualistic cultures (Epley et.al, 2007).  
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To summarize, the three-factor anthropomorphism theory 
demonstrates the existence, prevalence, and moderators 
of anthropomorphic thinking—i.e., people’s tendency to 
construe nonhuman entities as human. According to 
Epley et al. (2007, p. 864) “this theory predicts that people 
are more likely to anthropomorphize when 
anthropocentric knowledge is accessible and applicable, 
when motivated to be effective social agents, and when 
lacking a sense of social connection to other humans.” 
The three separate but interrelated factors work together 
to influence the attribution of human traits, intentions, and 
emotions to nonhuman entities. The theory of the mind 
(Waytz, Gray et al. 2010) serves as the psychological 
underpinning for the three factors, elucidating how 
inductive reasoning—sometimes or often based on 
egocentric biases—influences how people perceive other 
humans. Just as these perceptions can be unduly 
influenced by self-knowledge and self-motivations, so 
can anthropomorphism be subject to egocentric biases.  
Epley et al.’s (2007) three-factor theory has become 
widely accepted because it allows both conscious and 
unconscious thinking processes to play a role. 
Although the theory provides an empirically validated 
and generalized perspective of the anthropomorphism 
phenomenon regarding a wide range of nonhuman 
entities, it was not developed to explain the particular 
features of IT. In fact, one might argue that the theory 
treats technology as a “black box”: It does not consider 
the relationship and interaction between users’ 
psychological processes and the technology features—
an important oversight. Human and technology 
interactions are, by nature, ongoing, ever-evolving, 
and mutually influential. 
4 Technology Anthropomorphism: 
Enriching the Three-Factor Theory 
with the Needs-Affordances-
Features (NAF) Perspective 
In the next two sections, we discuss our core research 
question: How technology anthropomorphism leads to 
egocentric biases. We first advance the theory of AT 
by opening the black box of technology in the Epley et 
al. (2007) three-factor model. Following Karahanna et 
al.’s (2018) needs-affordances-features (NAF) 
perspective, we derive technology affordances from 
the three-factor model of elicited agent knowledge and 
the two psychological needs. We also illustrate how 
the anthropomorphic features identified by Pfeuffer et 
al. (2019) can be mapped to technology affordances.  
We selected affordances as the way to open up the three-
factor anthropomorphism model to the particularities of 
technology because affordances reflect the imbrication 
between the materiality of technology and users’ 
subjective perception of technology (Leonardi 2011). 
This approach, combining technical artifacts with 
anthropomorphic features and with psychological 
needs, enables us to gain deeper insights into the socio-
technical structure of TA and to generate predictions 
about the consequences of anthropomorphism for 
different types of technologies.  
Affordance theory adopts a sociotechnical perspective 
that theorizes about particular technologies while 
simultaneously incorporating social and contextual 
elements. We acknowledge the debate about the ontology 
of affordances (Volkoff & Strong, 2017), and we address 
the issue by treating affordance as a construct derived 
from the user-artifact relationship and not from 
technology alone (Volkoff & Strong, 2017). Note that 
people “may or may not perceive or attend to the 
affordance, according to [their] needs, but the affordance, 
being invariant, is always there to be perceived” (Gibson, 
1979; p. 11). That is to say, whether users perceive these 
affordances is not just a function of technology; instead, 
it depends on whether the affordance activates a need or 
the activation has sufficient strength. 
4.1 Needs-Affordances-Features (NAF) 
Perspective 
Karahanna et al. (2018) advanced the needs-affordances-
features (NAF) perspective on social media to 
demonstrate how the use of social media applications can 
be explained and predicted by linking different social 
media affordances with different users’ psychological 
needs. Karahanna et al. (2018) argued that technologies 
“have affordances that can fulfill certain psychological 
needs, and that the features of a technology enable the 
affordances that the technology can offer” (Karahanna et 
al., 2018; p. 739). They justified their prioritization of 
affordances, as opposed to features as follows: “There is 
more utility in theorizing a relationship between 
psychological needs and affordances rather than 
psychological needs and specific technology features 
since the affordances generalize across technology 
contexts” (Karahanna et al., 2018; p. 742). Karahanna et 
al. (2018) encouraged the study of different types of 
technologies in terms of how different affordances and 
contexts of use fulfill different psychological needs. We 
derive the three affordances on the basis of the cognitive 
factor and the two psychological needs in the three-factor 
model (Epley et al., 2007): human knowledge 
transference affordance, gaining personal control 
affordance, and sociality affordance.  
We also link the three affordances that map to the three-
factor model to the three categories of anthropomorphic 
features identified by Pfeuffer et al. (2019) (see Table 2). 
Pfeuffer et al. (2019, p. 6) identify three categories of 
anthropomorphic features that “are recognizable from an 
anthropocentric perspective of mental processes that 
involve perception and cognition through sensory 
information.”.
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Table 2. Linking Technology Features with Affordances 
Technology Anthropomorphic features Affordances 
Social robots: “an autonomous or semi-
autonomous robot that interacts and 
communicates with humans by 
following the behavioral norms 
expected by the people with whom the 
robot is intended to interact” (Bartneck 
& Forlizzi, 2004) 
Visual: humanlike facial features 
(Phillips et al., 2018); humanlike body 
features: surface/skin temperature (Park 
& Lee, 2014); gender features (De 
Angeli, 2012)  
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control; sociality 
Auditory: human voice output (Nass & 
Brave, 2005) 
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control; sociality 
Mental: emotional feedback (Eyssel et 
al., 2010)  
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control; sociality 
Autonomous vehicles: vehicles that 
control their own steering and speed 
(Waytz et.al, 2014) 
Mental: self-driving agency (Waytz et 
al., 2014) 
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control 
Personal intelligent assistants: mobile 
software agent that can perform tasks, 
or services, on behalf of an individual 
based on a combination of user input, 
location awareness, and the ability to 
access information from a variety of 
online sources (Moussawi, 2016) 
Visual: humanlike facial features (Kim 
et al., 2016) 
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control; sociality 
Auditory: human voice output 
(Moussawi & Koufaris, 2019) 
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control; sociality 
Mental: natural language processing 
(Moussawi & Koufaris, 2019) 
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control; sociality 
Recommendation agents: web-based 
agents that tailor vendors’ offerings to 
consumers according to their 
preferences (Li & Karahanna, 2015) 
Visual: virtual human representation 
(Nowak & Rauh, 2005; Yoo & Gretzel, 
2010); animation (Hess et al., 2009) 
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control; sociality 
Auditory: human voice output (Qiu & 
Benbasat, 2009) 
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control; sociality 
Mental: bodily gestures (Cowell & 
Stanney, 2005); extroverted 
“personality” (Hess et al., 2009) 
Human knowledge transference; 
gaining personal control; sociality 
The categories are nonexhaustive and nonexclusive. First, 
visual features pertain to appearance, movements, 
gestures, mimics, and gender. Second, auditory features 
include speech synthesizer and gender. Third, mental 
features capture cognitive elements (e.g., cognitive 
intelligence, dialog ability, content understanding); 
emotional elements (e.g., emotionality, emotional 
intelligence); and behavioral elements (personality traits, 
such as compassion).  
The different categories, as well as features in those 
categories, can support multiple affordances; for 
example, speech synthesis supports both the human 
knowledge transference affordance and the sociality 
affordance. The features and affordances together help 
to explain and predict the types of technologies with 
which TA is most likely to occur. The links we construct 
between technologies, anthropomorphic features, and 
the three pertinent affordances are based on studies 
reviewed in the Appendix 
4.1.1 Human Knowledge Transference 
Affordance 
We define human knowledge transference affordance 
as an affordance that first activates existing knowledge 
about human beings in general or about the person’s 
self-knowledge; this knowledge then is transferred to 
the technology. Visual, auditory, and mental features 
of technology can activate this knowledge (Pfeuffer et 
al., 2019). For example, a widely used visual interface 
feature is the avatar—a representation in the virtual 
world with the characteristics of a person (Suh et al., 
2011). Nowak and Rauh (2005) and Yoo and Gretzel 
(2010) found that the simple presence of an avatar in 
interfaces significantly increases TA in the context of 
websites and of social recommendation agents, leading 
users to apply human-related knowledge to the 
recommendation agents. Voice features also constitute 
a human knowledge transference affordance. For 
example, social robots with femalelike voices might 
trigger users’ knowledge and expectations about 
human gender. Schroeder and Epley (2016) found that 
hearing a human voice rather than seeing visual cues 
led people to believe the content was created by a 
human rather than a machine.  
In addition to visual features about human appearance, 
features such as name, gender, and human voice can be 
used to inductively infer anthropomorphic knowledge 
representations. For example, Waytz et al. (2014) 
found that when an autonomous vehicle is given a 
human name and gender and is given a voice through 
human audio files, users are more likely to draw on 
human knowledge to make sense of and predict the 
behavior of the vehicle, compared with users in 
vehicles that are not given these auditory and mental 
features.  
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4.1.2 Gaining Personal Control Affordance 
Personal control affordance refers to the technology 
affordance that enables users to have a sense of control 
over the technology, particularly when they face an 
uncertain technology use environment. When 
technology’s visual, auditory, and mental features 
resemble human beings, these features provide a sense 
of familiarity and reliability for users (de Visser et al., 
2016). Users thus gain personal control over the 
technology. For example, giving autonomous vehicles 
a gender as an interactivity feature or giving them 
humanlike voice features facilitates the personal 
control affordance (Waytz et al., 2014). Autonomous 
vehicles, as a novel technology, trigger uncertainty 
because of their complicated functions and lack of 
transparency. When users drive autonomous vehicles, 
they can feel a loss of control because the vehicle 
diminishes their autonomy of driving (Rödel, 2016). 
Making vehicles appear human through the three 
categories of visual, auditory, and mental features can 
provide users with the personal control affordance.  
4.1.3 The Sociality Affordance 
In the existing literature, sociality affordances are 
defined as the possibilities for action that people offer one 
another (Gaver, 1996). For our purposes, sociality 
affordances provide action possibilities between humans 
and IT. Technology’s visual, auditory, and mental 
features all enable users to have social interaction with the 
technology—interaction that resembles real human social 
interactions. For example, adding virtual human 
representation to technology artifacts can increase the 
sociality of technology, as Swinth and Blascovich (2002) 
demonstrate: When humans interact with avatars, “their 
[the avatars’] behavior and responses resemble those 
elicited during normal human-human social interaction” 
(p. 24). Technologies using voice over the telephone, 
more than text over email, were found to afford sociality 
(Schroeder & Epley, 2016). 
Qiu and Benbasat (2009) and Hess et al. (2009) found that 
adding audio features to avatars as recommendation 
agents can strengthen sociality perceptions and enable 
users to act with agents in a social manner. This effect is 
stronger for an extroverted voice, compared to an 
introverted voice (Lee & Nass, 2005); the extroverted 
voice is perceived as more sociable. Bartz et al. (2016) 
found that the interactive dialog mode of the technology 
(mental feature) can significantly influence the extent to 
which IT is perceived as humanlike. Such mental features 
are reflected as “behavioral scripts” in users’ interaction 
with technology and involve both the sociality and the 
agency of the technology. Certain behavioral scripts are 
more likely to trigger TA. For example, websites with 
avatars that can follow social conventions (e.g., asking 
questions or saying “goodbye”) increase TA, compared 
with avatars that do not follow these behavioral scripts 
(Nowak & Rauh, 2005). 
4.2 Interaction between Affordances and 
Three-Factor Model 
4.2.1 Human Knowledge Transference and 
Technology Anthropomorphism 
Elicited agent knowledge is the cognitive factor of 
anthropomorphism (Epley et al., 2007). Technology 
features can make human-related knowledge more 
accessible in users’ minds and enable actions to 
transfer human-related knowledge to the technology. 
As more human knowledge transfers to the technology, 
users will engage in the inductive reasoning process 
that attributes human traits to technology, thereby 
leading to technology anthropomorphism. Therefore, 
based on the three-factor model and affordance theory, 
we propose that: 
Proposition 1: Technology features that support 
human knowledge transference affordances can 
lead to technology anthropomorphism. 
NAF argues that different social media affordances can 
fulfill users’ psychological needs (Karahanna et al., 
2018); similarly, we argue that the affordances of 
sociality and gaining personal control can satisfy, or 
fulfill, two psychological needs identified in the three-
factor anthropomorphism theory: sociality needs  
effectance needs. (Since elicited agent knowledge is 
not a psychological need, NAF logic does not apply). 
4.2.2 Sociality Needs Fulfilled by the Sociality 
Affordance 
The three-factor theory suggests that projecting 
humanlike thinking onto nonhuman entities can be 
driven by users’ sociality needs. In turn, technology’s 
sociality affordance, which is enabled by 
anthropomorphic features, can fulfill users’ sociality 
needs. For example, Eyssel and Reich (2013: p. 122) 
found that social robots’ humanlike features, such as 
“mental capacities and essentially human personality 
traits,” can provide sociality affordance. They report 
that “participants anthropomorphized a social robot to 
a greater extent after being put in a state of emotional 
loneliness as compared to a control group that 
remained in a neutral state of mind” (Eyssel & Reich, 
2013; p. 122). The technology incorporated a sociality 
affordance that reduced participants’ loneliness state. 
Mourey et al. (2017) found that a smartphone’s 
sociality affordances, which are enabled by humanlike 
features (e.g., having humanlike names and 
interactivity) fulfill users’ sociality needs after they are 
socially excluded. In other words, TA is effective in 
fulfilling users’ sociality needs.  
Proposition 2: Technology features that support 
sociality affordances fulfill users’ sociality needs 
and can lead to technology anthropomorphism. 
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4.2.3 Effectance Needs Fulfilled by the Sociality 
Affordance 
Effectance needs can also be fulfilled by technology’s 
affordance of gaining personal control. For example, 
Waytz et al. (2014) found that anthropomorphism of 
autonomous vehicles enables the affordance of gaining 
personal control because making vehicles seem human 
reduces users’ perceived uncertainty about the 
autonomous vehicle. That is, they resemble human 
functions more, thereby fulfilling users’ needs for 
personal control over the vehicle. Similarly, de Visser et 
al. (2016) examined the effects that cognitive agent 
affordances had in enhancing users’ perceptions of 
personal control, thus fulfilling their effectance needs. 
They demonstrated that anthropomorphizing cognitive 
agents (e.g., smart voice assistants with humanlike voices 
or virtual advisors with humanlike representation) can 
satisfy users’ needs for control and reduce uncertainty in 
the technology adoption and use process. 
Proposition 3: Technology features that support 
affordances for gaining control fulfill users’ 
effectance needs and can lead to technology 
anthropomorphism. 
In the next section, we discuss how technology 
affordances can intensify psychological needs and 
elicited agent knowledge and lead to anchoring and 
adjustment processes, which can increase egocentric 
biases. 
5 Beyond Fulfillment: Strong 
Anchoring, Weak Adjustment, and 
Egocentric Biases2 
The three-factor model argues that inductive reasoning 
can anchor around self-knowledge under high cognitive 
loads, thus making the egocentric biases more likely to 
emerge. Under high cognitive loads, people will build 
on their own perspective, “only subsequently, serially, 
and effortfully accounting for differences between 
themselves and others until a plausible estimate is 
reached” (Epley et al., 2004; p. 328). Adjustment to 
anchoring can fail when people lack the motivation to 
understand how the nonhuman agent behaves 
differently from them or if people lack experiences to 
build relevant knowledge about them. We argue that the 
affordances of advanced technologies can intensify the 
anchoring, and when users’ cognitive resources are 
limited, their capacity for adjustment is weakened, 
leading to more egocentric biases.  
With advanced technologies, affordances are not static 
but ever changing—particularly when technology is 
self-adaptive (e.g., in taking on human functions, such 
 
2 “Technology” in this section represents an aggregation of 
features and affordances. 
as learning). To make sense of the changing affordances, 
people must be able to construe them through their 
knowledge base and, in doing so, they seek to perceive 
the “mind” of the technology. The most readily 
accessible knowledge they can apply when making 
sense of technology affordances is their self-knowledge 
(Epley et al., 2007). As advanced technologies take on 
mental functions long associated mainly with humans, 
the anchoring on self-knowledge is likely to intensify in 
their inductive reasoning. This anchoring leads to 
egocentric biases. Any correction is difficult because of 
the ambivalent and changing nature of the technology.  
In addition, users’ anchoring on self-knowledge and 
psychological needs is intensified under heightened 
cognitive load. Kang and Kim (2020) provide an 
empirical illustration. When users are exposed to a 
brand having anthropomorphic features while facing 
high cognitive demand in a highly interactive game (one 
that induces sociality needs), the intensity and the TA in 
that context together elicit self-knowledge, leading to 
increased egocentric biases.  
In the following sections, we examine egocentric biases 
that are increased by three types of affordances under 
high cognitive load. Technology affordances intensify 
users’ anchoring on knowledge and psychological 
needs. In addition, the adjustment and correction 
processes are inhibited, which leads to increased 
egocentric biases. 
5.1 Human Knowledge Transference and 
Biased Perception of Technology and 
Self 
We propose that the affordance of human knowledge 
transference can intensify users’ anchoring on their self-
knowledge and, in doing so, can diminish the likelihood 
of the adjustment or correction of that knowledge. This 
resistance to adjustment can transfer stereotypes (a self-
knowledge structure) to the technology and, in turn, 
induce in the technology biased human knowledge and 
biased self-perceptions. Greenwald et al. (2003) refer to 
the stereotype  as a generalized belief about specific 
types of individuals or their behavior and intended to 
represent the entire group of these individuals or their 
behaviors as a whole. Stereotypes, as a type of egocentric 
bias about humans (Pfeuffer et al., 2019), can be primed 
and more easily accessed when users’ egocentric 
perceptions of other humans are anchored by 
technology’s affordance of human knowledge 
transference (Dennis et al., 2013). For example, the 
humanlike appearance of social robots has the affordance 
of transferring human knowledge. This affordance, in 
turn, can strengthen the anchoring of users’ self-
knowledge about human appearance (e.g., gender-typical 
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features). When users’ self-knowledge becomes more 
salient, any related knowledge structures—for example, 
stereotypes about gender— might also be activated. Such 
stereotyped perceptions represent egocentric biases. 
In addition, the human knowledge transference 
affordance can weaken the adjustment and correction 
process that would help shift users away from their 
egocentric inferences to more accurate inferences. 
Because the human knowledge transference affordance 
makes self-knowledge so accessible, engaging users in 
such adjustment processes becomes more difficult (Tamir 
& Mitchell, 2013). Therefore, when self-knowledge 
structures like stereotypes become activated, sustained, 
and difficult to correct, users are more likely to transfer 
their biases to the technology with which they interact. 
This transference of stereotypes is more likely to 
happen when cognitive resources are depleted 
(Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). For example, 
users are more likely to apply stereotyped knowledge 
to technology under high processing demands (Park et 
al., 2008) or in low mindfulness states (Thatcher et al., 
2018) because when individuals have limited cognitive 
resources, they may lack the ability to engage in 
adjustment and correction processes by reflecting on 
the reality of social groups (Tamir and Mitchell, 2013). 
Research has demonstrated that when users interact with 
avatars (Dewester et al., 2009) and social robots (Eyssel 
& Hegel, 2012), they apply gender stereotypes in their 
judgment about the characteristics and capabilities of the 
technology. In the same ways that people 
anthropomorphize goods and services, they might 
anthropomorphize technology by applying stereotyped 
assessments, such as “beautiful is good” (Wan et al., 
2016). As a result, technology that has an unattractive 
humanlike appearance would be devalued, despite its 
strong functional capabilities (Hanson, 2006). 
Stereotypes might then prevail and be reinforced—
particularly if users make judgments based on the surface 
characteristics of the technology. An observational study 
on human-robot interaction revealed that people’s 
conversations with a human robot can engender negative 
verbal disinhibition (i.e., expressing negative and abusive 
words to the robot) (De Angeli & Brahnam, 2008; 
Brahnam & De Angeli, 2012). Popular writing also 
illustrates the phenomenon of transferring bias to 
technology. A recent article suggests, for example, that if 
patients transfer stereotyped biases about the nursing 
occupation, they might resist assistance from nursing 
robots that don’t fit their nursing stereotype (e.g., robots 
that don’t have a female voice), even though all robots can 
perform the nursing task equally well (Simon, 2018).  
Proposition 4: When users’ cognitive resources are 
low, a technology’s affordance of human 
knowledge transference intensifies users’ 
anchoring on self-knowledge, weakens adjustment, 
and increases egocentric biases.  
5.2 The Gaining Personal Control 
Affordance and Perceptions of Threat 
from Technology 
Technology’s affordance of gaining personal control 
enables users to increase their control. We propose 
that, under limited cognitive resources, the 
affordance of gaining personal control can intensify 
users’ anchoring on effectance needs and can result 
in an egocentric bias toward what they perceive as 
threats to meeting those needs. Strong effectance 
needs can lead users to perceive technology with 
humanlike features (e.g., resembling human faces) as 
competent and dependable and thus exhibiting 
stronger agency (Chen et al., 2018). In addition, users 
who become more anchored on their effectance needs 
may perceive greater similarities between nonhuman 
agents and human agents. To illustrate, a driver with 
strong effectance needs might perceive an 
autonomous vehicle that has humanlike features to be 
a “reliable driver,” which may threaten the user’s own 
sense of autonomy and self-perception as a proficient 
driver. Such users might be less likely to accept 
autonomous vehicles because the agency they assign 
to the technology interferes with their own agency. 
However, such rationalizing represents an egocentric 
bias because the users are distorting the reality of the 
agency of the technology based on their 
psychological needs (Kunda, 1990). In the presence 
of TA, blurred boundaries between humans and their 
technology—particularly when that technology is 
perceived as highly competent—can cause users to 
perceive threats to their own agency. Moreover, this 
egocentric bias that leads users to perceive threats to 
their agency can further intensify the agency that 
users perceive in the technology (Kang & Kim, 
2020). In this case, as users anthropomorphize the 
technology, they rely more and more on their self-
knowledge to make inferences about the technology, 
thus further strengthening their egocentric biases and 
weakening the likelihood of adjustment.  
Previous literature has demonstrated that human users 
perceive threats from competent technology. 
According to Kim et al. (2016), a digital helper that 
users anthropomorphize because of its interactivity and 
humanlike visual representation can undermine 
individuals’ perceived autonomy. They showed that 
users construed the help they get from technology to 
be the same as the help they get from humans. When 
users’ cognitive resources were low (e.g., when they 
were under time pressure), meaning that their 
effectance needs were heightened, this effect of 
perceived threat was shown to be particularly strong. 
This research demonstrated that the perceived threats 
could be mitigated when users’ effectance needs were 
under control. 
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Proposition 5: When users’ cognitive resources are 
low, a technology’s affordance of gaining personal 
control intensifies users’ anchoring on their 
effectance needs, weakens adjustment, and 
increases egocentric biases. 
5.3 Sociality Affordance and 
Misidentification with Technology 
When users anchor on their sociality needs and have 
limited cognitive resources, they may fail to adjust or 
correct cognitive resources, leading to 
misidentification with the technology. For example, 
interacting with technology that offers a sociality 
affordance can cause users to anchor their sociality 
needs. In cases of limited cognitive resources, they 
might then have difficulty distinguishing virtual social 
relationships from real ones and high-quality human 
relationships from low-quality ones (Turkle, 2005). 
Sharkey and Sharkey (2012) argue that caretaking 
robots for elderly people that have humanlike facial 
features and voice features could lead to undesirable 
outcomes, such as avoidance of real social interactions 
with human beings. The risk is particularly high when 
elderly people have decreased cognitive functioning 
and more difficulty controlling their sociality needs 
(Carstensen, 1992). Elderly people might not be able 
to adjust or correct their egocentric biases and 
perceptions about the social support and warmth the 
robots offer because of their sociality needs: They hope 
to have these needs met by the anthropomorphized 
robots, even though the robots’ capacity to do so is 
often ephemeral and illusory (Turkle, 2005).  
Stronger anchoring on sociality needs and weaker 
adjustment of that anchoring also might lead to 
excessive self-disclosure to technology. Such 
disclosure may be driven by users’ strong need to 
belong, particularly when they lack authentic social 
connections and when they anthropomorphize 
technology, trust it, and engage in more self-disclosure 
with it. Because of their failure to adjust their 
egocentric biases, users may not be able to see the 
reality that excessive self-disclosure with 
anthropomorphized technology can be harmful. In 
addition, studies show that users who struggle with 
social anxiety—i.e., those who are challenged by 
social interaction but still have a strong need for 
sociality—have more difficulty controlling their 
sociality needs. Such individuals tend to reveal more 
information and more intimate information about 
themselves when interacting with a virtual human (i.e., 
an AT), relative to their disclosure in video interactions 
with actual humans (Kang & Gratch, 2010). In 
addition, Pickard et al. (2016) found that subjects 
preferred anthropomorphized technology over actual 
humans when asked to self-reveal about more sensitive 
topics because they perceived it as less judgmental and 
more trustworthy. 
Proposition 6: When users’ cognitive resources are 
low, a technology’s sociality affordance intensifies 
users’ anchoring on sociality needs, reduces 
adjustment, and increases egocentric biases. 
Figure 1 summarizes the propositions.  
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6 Discussion and Implications 
This paper seeks to provide insight into what drives the 
anthropomorphizing of technology and to identify 
some of the negative consequences that are less often 
discussed in the literature. Users’ prior knowledge 
about humans in general and their self-knowledge are 
brought to bear on their tendency to anthropomorphize 
technology. In addition to the projection of this prior 
elicited agent knowledge, TA is motivated by users’ 
efficacy and sociality needs. According to the three-
factor theory of anthropomorphism (Epley et al., 
2007), technology is like any other nonhuman entity in 
terms of the psychological account of when and why 
people anthropomorphize nonhuman entities. People 
anthropomorphize by attending to and accessing prior 
knowledge about humans or themselves, and they do 
so to feel efficacious and to be socially connected—
particularly when finding themselves in environments 
that are fraught with uncertainty and ambiguity. Under 
high cognitive loads, users can intensify their 
anchoring on self-knowledge. When this anchoring is 
not followed by adjustment that corrects for undue 
reliance on self-knowledge, egocentric biases arise. 
Although the foundational cognitive factor—elicited 
agent knowledge—and the two needs of sociality and 
efficacy provide a psychological explanation as to why 
people associate human traits, capabilities, and 
emotions with technology, the existing literature has 
not theorized the technological antecedents of TA. 
This oversight has occurred despite demonstrations 
that a wide variety of technologies triggers 
anthropomorphism. In addition, attributing humanlike 
characteristics to technology occurs not just with 
complex and novel technologies, like autonomous 
cars, but also with simple speech-based email 
(Schroeder & Epley, 2016). Yet differences in the 
extent of TA also emerge. For instance, auditory 
features are associated with anthropomorphizing more 
than visual cues. Also, as advanced technologies 
incorporate more anthropomorphic mental features, 
the technology we use becomes more ambivalent and 
biased knowledge about humans affects how 
technology is anthropomorphized. However, the 
generalized and well-validated three-factor 
anthropomorphism theory treats all technology like 
any other nonhuman entity. The theory is not able to 
explain differences across technologies because 
technology is not included in the model.  
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
We expand the three-factor anthropomorphism theory 
in two ways. We integrate Karahanna et al.’s (2018) 
NAF perspective on technology use motivation with 
the three-factor theory. This research contributes to IS 
literature by extending the NAF perspective to the 
phenomenon of thinking of technology as 
humanlike—as an interplay between anthropomorphic 
features, their affordances, and users’ psychological 
needs. 
We also go beyond the NAF perspective that treats 
technology as static to consider changing affordances 
with advanced technologies. As technologies become 
increasingly ambivalent and self-adaptive, technology 
affordances can intensify egocentric biases. For 
example, Kang and Kim (2020, p. 46) note that “a 
smart thermostat (e.g., Nest Learning Thermostat) is 
capable of automatically adjusting temperature 
settings according to information acquired though 
interactions with linked objects in the room, such as a 
heater or a smartphone, to accomplish a specific goal 
of energy saving.” Because interactions with such 
advanced technologies are context specific and 
adapted to specific users’ needs, the nonhuman agent 
is personalized to be more similar to the user than other 
humans. To make sense of the self-adapting 
technology, users intensify their reliance on self-
knowledge in their inductive reasoning without 
corrections that would adjust away from the egocentric 
anchors. 
We discuss how the reliance on self-knowledge with 
ambivalent and self-adaptive advanced technologies 
can intensify the construction of egocentric biases. TA 
affordances can intensify the construction of these 
egocentric biases when cognitive resources are limited, 
stemming from strong anchoring on self-knowledge 
and leading to weaker adjustment processes. These 
biases are formed and accumulated and applied as a 
recursive process. Because users bring their self-
knowledge to their interactions with advanced 
technologies, advanced technologies automatically 
collect and accumulate data from users on these biases 
and the technology adopts these biases. Because these 
biases again reflect how the user constructs the world 
and interacts with advanced technology, opportunities 
for the correction of egocentric biases are limited. In 
other words, the reduction of technology-imbued 
biases must begin with people. As long as people 
accumulate biased knowledge and hold discriminatory 
stereotypes, technology will do the same. Thus, our 
model goes beyond NAF and provides a starting point 
to consider users’ psychological responses to changing 
affordances with advanced technologies and some of 
the negative consequences that might result.  
6.2 Future Research Agenda 
Our model not only explains TA as it relates to current 
technology but also provides theoretical predictions for 
future research on TA. As new advanced technologies 
come to the market, our model could be a starting point 
for predictions about and implications of its influence on 
users, based on the extent to which the contexts of use 
and the technologies’ features influence users in 
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anthropomorphizing the technology. For example, our 
model could be used to make predictions about users’ 
experience with emerging smart home technologies 
(e.g., Google Home). First, the NAF perspective we 
adopt in our model could identify how features of this 
smart home technology (e.g., auditory features) provide 
affordances (e.g., increased personal control), and how 
users’ psychological needs interact with these 
affordances. Second, as users anthropomorphize their 
smart homes, we predict that the inductive knowledge 
base will be self-knowledge because knowledge about 
the self is the most readily accessible form of 
knowledge. Anchoring on self-knowledge without 
adjustments may give rise to egocentric biases. The 
presence of low cognitive resources in interactions make 
corrections effortful and unlikely. Hoffman and Novak 
(2017, p. 9) argue that smart homes provide affordances 
that enable users to “exercise their capacities.” Our 
theorizing suggests that these capacities include users’ 
egocentric biases. However, at some point, the 
technologies may also begin to undermine users’ 
perceptions of their control over and responsibility for 
the technology. As a result, users might experience 
“self-restriction” and “self-reduction,” and their 
interaction with the smart home may shift, based on the 
perceptions of threatened freedom. In this case, the 
smart home’s affordance is then seen as constraining the 
users’ actions and experiences. 
Future research should explore the implications of TA 
for users’ privacy-related behavior. Can 
misidentification with technology cause users to 
excessively disclose sensitive information to the 
technology? Such misidentification might occur if 
individuals prefer interacting with anthropomorphized 
technology over real humans for self-disclosure 
purposes because they perceive technology to be less 
judgmental and more trustworthy (Pickard et al., 
2016). However, an interplay between sociality and 
effectance needs also might complicate users’ self-
disclosure intentions regarding TA. On the one hand, a 
greater perceived sociality affordance may elicit more 
self-disclosure if it strengthens users’ anchoring on 
sociality needs; on the other hand, a greater perceived 
affordance of gaining personal control could elicit 
more awareness of technology’s agency and potential 
privacy threats, thus strengthening users’ anchoring on 
effectance needs and inhibiting self-disclosure. Future 
research should explore factors that moderate the 
relative strength of sociality needs versus effectance 
needs in influencing users’ privacy concerns and self-
disclosure behaviors.  
Furthermore, our model offers avenues to explore how 
cognitive resources might be increased in the TA 
process. For example, “IT mindfulness”—an IS 
construct related to self-control—is worth exploring in 
the TA process. Thatcher et al. (2018) have 
conceptualized IT mindfulness (i.e., mindfulness 
associated with IT use) as an overarching mental 
mindset with two characteristics: individual awareness 
of the context and openness to the value-adding 
applications of IT. IT mindfulness represents a highly 
attentive and self-controlled state of IT use, enabling 
users to better control their anchoring and channel 
resources into correction processes. Mindfulness as a 
general cognitive state has been shown to prevent the 
assignment of stereotypical biases and expressions of 
discrimination toward other humans. As Ostafin and 
Kassman (2012; p. 2) demonstrate, “an aim of 
mindfulness is to limit the ability of automatically 
activated verbal-conceptual content derived from past 
experience to bias thought and behavior.” Similarly, 
users’ IT mindfulness could inhibit them from heavy 
reliance on self-knowledge and prevent the transfer of 
biases to anthropomorphized technology. 
Interestingly, recent research suggests that increasing 
users’ IT mindfulness also can backfire for some 
technology-based tasks. Research shows that 
mindfulness can decrease action motivation because 
mindful people focus on the present and lack an active 
motivation to engage in future-oriented tasks 
(Hafenbrack & Vohs, 2019). Because adjustment and 
correction processes also require an active motivation 
(Epley et al., 2007), future research might explore the 
prediction that, for some types of technology tasks that 
require persistence and a long-term view, increasing 
mindfulness can prevent biases in the short term but 
might decrease task performance over the long term.  
Our model also suggests opportunities for the use of 
emerging research methods to study TA, such as the 
NeuroIS method (Dimoka et al., 2011). Previous 
research has used neuroscientific methods to reveal 
the similarities and differences in the perceptions of 
human agents and anthropomorphized agents (Riedl et 
al., 2014). However, to our knowledge, the 
neurological mechanisms leading to different 
consequences of TA have not yet been explored. 
Further neuropsychological process evidence is 
needed to gain deeper insights into the processes 
underlying egocentric biases. Neuropsychological 
research methods could advance our understanding of 
egocentric biases by disentangling the anchoring and 
adjustment process, by demonstrating the role of 
cognition, and by providing an in-depth exploration of 
how specific anthropomorphic features lead to 
specific egocentric biases. Future research also might 
introduce other innovative methods to study TA 
phenomena. For example, researchers could 
incorporate neuroendocrine methods (Riedl et al., 
2012) to study how hormones change during the 
process of TA, which could provide insights into the 
dynamic changes in users’ hormonally and 
neurologically influenced physiological needs as they 
interact with advanced technologies. 
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6.3 Practical Implications 
Our model of egocentric biases produced by the 
process of TA provides practical implications for 
various stakeholders, including technology designers, 
implementers, and users. Our model implies that, in the 
design of new technology, designers should be mindful 
of designing anthropomorphic information systems 
(e.g., Diederich et al., 2020) because such systems can 
propagate egocentric biases. Designers are encouraged 
to avoid excessive intimacy cues, in order to decrease 
the ambivalence of the technology by increasing 
design transparency (Lyons, & Havig, 2014), and to 
deploy personalization that is contextually aware 
(Kaisler et al., 2018). Intimacy cues may involve 
personal labels (e.g., humanlike names) (Stoner et al., 
2018), intimate language use (Bazarova et al., 2013), 
or touch (Abbey & Melby, 1986). We encourage 
designers to avoid humanlike labels or names for voice 
assistants (e.g., Alexa or Siri) and restrict voice 
assistants’ use of overly intimate language in 
communication with users. 
Design transparency—which is defined as the extent 
to which technology design enables users to build 
mental models of the technology’s internal functions 
(Lyons & Having, 2014; Stowers et al., 2016)—can 
be an effective remedy for sensitized effectance needs 
and perceived threats. Providing users with a more 
transparent view of technology’s internal functions 
can reduce the uncertainty associated with the 
technology. Transparency also reduces the cognitive 
load in the corrective processes (Fishbach et al., 
2010) and can mitigate users’ perceived threats to 
their agency from technology. This remedy is 
consistent with recent technical developments that 
require the machine’s learning algorithm to “explain 
itself” (Ribeiro et al., 2016). 
The “contextual awareness” of technology is defined 
as its ability to sense and react to environmental 
changes around it (Kaisler et al., 2018). Social robots 
with high levels of “mindfulness” should be able to 
adapt to heterogeneous, interactive environments. As 
users start to display stereotypes to social robots, 
contextually aware social robots should be capable of  
changing their behavioral scripts and responding in 
ways that do not adopt or encourage negative 
stereotyping, thus inhibiting the personalization in the 
anthropomorphized technology of users’ stereotypical 
knowledge structure. 
Organizations implementing advanced technology 
should be aware of “risky” anthropomorphizing 
conditions and should strategically minimize the 
negative effects stemming from TA. For example, 
organizations need to pay attention to the conditions 
under which egocentric biases are more likely to occur 
(e.g., where tasks require high cognitive resources). To 
prevent egocentric biases, organizations might 
consider either reducing cognitive demand for the task 
or providing support and training for employees to 
increase their resources during IT use.  
For users, our model also provides practical guidance 
on how to prevent egocentric biases. For example, we 
suggest that users should be aware of the potential 
harmful consequences of forming an intimate 
relationship with their smart assistants and should be 
more attentive to protecting their own privacy.  
Our theorizing also has limitations. First, our model 
is limited to individual-level technology use and does 
not consider collective use. Different ways of 
interacting with technology can happen at multiple 
levels, leading to a wider range of potential negative 
consequences. Second, other mechanisms—in 
addition to the anchoring and adjustment process we 
discuss here—might influence how TA produces 
egocentric and other biases.  
Finally, we acknowledge that our one-to-one matching 
between affordances and needs might be viewed as 
overly simplistic. Karahanna et al. (2018) constructed 
a comprehensive exploration of affordances on a single 
digital artifact: social media. In their model, they 
present a more generic set of psychological needs, with 
each affordance satisfying several psychological 
needs. Our theoretical model is different from theirs in 
a few ways: First, our scope includes features, 
affordances, and needs that are relevant to TA; second, 
the TA phenomenon can occur across different 
technology types; and third, we derive affordances 
from the three-factor model of anthropomorphism 
rather than deriving them directly from technology 
artifacts. Additional research is needed to map 
affordances of technology more generally (i.e., beyond 
the affordances defined by the three-factor model) onto 
users’ psychological needs as they relate to TA. 
In conclusion, advanced technology that can lead to 
humanlike attributions has enormous economic and 
social value. Therefore, understanding the nature of 
TA, as well as its consequences for users, is both 
timely and critical. Our research contributes to this 
goal and to the IS literature on technology 
anthropomorphism, based on the needs-affordances-
features perspective and on egocentric biases. Our 
theoretical investigation can provide insights for 
technology designers, implementers, and users on how 
to minimize the potential negative consequences of 
egocentric biases produced by TA, thus increasing the 
social and individual welfare made possible by 
advanced technology. 
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Table A1. Reinterpretation of Empirical Research Related to Elicited Agent Knowledge 
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Table A2. Reinterpretation of Empirical Research Related to Effectance Needs 
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Table A3. Reinterpretation of Empirical Research Related to Sociality Needs 
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